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ALIENS: THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CLASSIFICATION
FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR
J. RAND CLIFFE

And if a strangersojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not vex
him. But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as
one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself.
Leviticus 19:33,34
It has long been presumed that citizenship is a natural prerequisite
for admission to the bar.' The presumption is indefensible in light of
case development defining the right of the state to limit bar admissions
and discriminate against aliens. The reasons propounded for excluding
aliens as a class from entrance to the legal profession are anachronisms
of a period of race prejudice which also must fall when confronted with
these cases and the equal protection clause.
STATE REGULATION OF BAR ADMISSIONS

By far the majority of jurisdictions agree that the judiciary makes
the ultimate determination of admission standards and admissibility of
the individual applicant. 2 Because admission to the bar is a judicial,
not a ministerial function,3 these states view the power of the judiciary
to set admission standards as inherent. 4 Many of the states recognize the
right of the legislature to set some minimum standards in the interest
of public welfare, but these are not binding upon the judiciary. 5 Therefore, the courts may alter the rules for admission without the consent
of the legislature and without even finding that the legislative requirement is substantively unconstitutional. Thus, when one speaks of state
regulation of admission standards, state judicial regulation is meant,
for the judiciary has the power whether it uses it or not.
1 Templar v. Michigan State Bd. of Examiners of Barbers, 90 N.W. 1058, 1059 (Mich.
1902); W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINT 126 (1956); 1
R.C.L. Aliens § 11 (1929): "The right of the state to deny to aliens the right to practice
law is undoubted."
2 Application of Houston, 378 P.2d 644, 645 (Alas. 1963).
3 Brydonjack v. State Bar, 281 P. 1018, 1020 (Cal. 1929).
4 In re Lavine, 41 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1935); Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar
Ass'n, 312 P.2d 998 (Colo. 1957); Herberger v. Clark, 169 A.2d 652, 658 (Conn. 1961).
5 Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690, 692 (Alas. 1971); Herberger v. Clark, 169 A.2d
652, 656 (Conn. 1961).
6 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378, 18 L. Ed. 366, 370 (1867); In re ChiDooh Li, 488 P.2d 259 (Wash. 1971).
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The power of the state to restrict bar admissions is derived from its
police power to regulate in the interest of the public's health, safety or
welfare.7 The generally recognized interest behind admission standards
is the "protection of the public from incompetent and dishonest practitioners." To this end the state may set whatever standards will ensure
that licensed lawyers are competent, but is limited by the requirements
that the qualifications are rationally related to the fitness to practice
law.9 Standards may not be overly inclusive; any standard which excludes some unfit applicants but in so doing "also bars, arbitrarily and
capriciously, applicants who are eminently qualified for admission"'10
will be held violative of the equal protection clause.
That the provisions of the equal protection clause apply to aliens has
been settled since Yick Wo v. Hopkins." The promise offered by Yick
Wo was often illusory however. States have systematically excluded
aliens from working at various occupations. 12 Where the occupations
were those frequently associated with criminal activity, the courts upheld the discrimination "on the ground that aliens as a class do not
have the necessary character qualifications. 18 Where the occupation
7 Grievance Comm. of State Bar v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945,
no writ).
8 State ex rel. Boynton v. Perkins, 28 P.2d 765, 769 (Kan. 1939).
9 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77 S. Ct. 752, 756, 1 L. Ed.2d
796, 801 (1957).
10 Keenan v. Board of Bar Examiners, 817 F. Supp. 1350, 1360 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
11118 U.S. 856, 369, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1070, 30 L. Ed. 220, 226 (1886):
The Fourteenth Amendment . . . is not confined to citizens .... These provisions
are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color or of nationality . . . . (Emphasis
added.)
12 For the following, one of the states or the District of Columbia requires citizenships:
Boxing promoter, electrolysis, embalmer and funeral director apprentice, explosives
dealer, fish breeder (domestic), gas fitter, investigator, junkdealer, manicurist, pedicurist, masseur, masseuse, outfitter for hunting or fishing, naturopathist, pilot (aviation), poison dealer, policeman (special), poultry inspector, refrigerated truck operator,
watchman, guard or patrolman, wrestling. M. KONVITz, THE ALIEN AND THE AsIATIC
IN AMERICAN LAW 211 (1946).
Exclusions such as the above have received judicial endorsement in the following cases:
United States ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 47 S. Ct. 630, 71 L. Ed. 1115
(1927) (poolroom operator); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 44 S. Ct. 515, 68 L. Ed. 1041
(1924) (pawnbroker); In re Naka's License, 9 Alas. 1 (Dist. Ct. 1934) and Tragreser v. Gray,
20 A. 905 (Md. Ct. App. 1890) (retail liquor sales); Commonwealth v. Hana, 81 N.E. 149
(Mass. 1907) and State v. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Me. 1900) (hawkers and peddlers);
right v. May, 149 N.W. 9 (Minn. 1914) (auctioneer); Miller v. City of Niagra Falls,
202 N.Y.S. 549 (App. Div. 1924) (soft drink sales); Gizzarelli v. Presbrey, 117 A. 359
(R.I. 1922) (motorbus operator). Perhaps the height of ridiculousness was reached by the
state statute that forbade to aliens the right to own dogsl See In re Dogs Owned by
Aliens, 28 Pa. Dist. 270 (1918) citing Pa. Pub. L. 644, Act of June 1, 1915. See also
Commonwealth v. Preozki, 28 Pa. Dist. 352 (1918).
18 Legislation, Constitutionality of Legislation Discriminating Against the Alien in His
Right to Work, 83 PA. L. REv. 74, 79 (1934). This same author's statistics demonstrate
that such an argument could equally support domestic race restrictions also. Id. at 79
n.28. The same argument appears to have been extended to occupations potentially
harmful to the public. In Gizzarelli v. Presbrey, 117 A. 359 (R.I. 1922), the Rhode Island
Supreme Court upheld alien exclusion from the occupation of motorbus operator, stating:
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required some degree of specialized training, the only logic for exclusion appears to have been that aliens as a class are incapable of advanced
learning.1 4 These exclusionary statutes were the product of a xenophobic era in which aliens were denied the right to hunt,15 fish,' 6 work for
the state,' 7 own land,18 and draw welfare.1 9 This era hopefully ended
with the 1952 act 20 which ended the United States policy of denying to
aliens, upon the basis of race, the right to become a citizen through
naturalization. 2 1 During this period, Truax v. Raich22 stood as the only
Supreme Court case limiting the power of the state to exclude aliens
from benefits available to citizens. In Truax the court stated that the
police power of the state "does not go so far as to make it possible for
the state to deny lawful inhabitants, because of . . . nationality, the
ordinary means of earning a livelihood."' s Truax, however, was not
24
interpreted as extending to the professions.
For the alien, as for the Negro, the full extent of the equal protection
clause did not blossom until very late. In 1946 the Supreme Court, in
Takahasi v. Fish & Game Commission,25 held constitutionally infirm
a California statute denying aliens equal commercial fishing privileges
"(Als aliens as a class are naturally less interested in the state, safety of citizens and the
public welfare than citizens of the state, to allow them to operate motorbusses would ...
tend to increase the danger to passengers and to the public using the highways." Id. at 360.
14 See Sashihara v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 46 P.2d 804, 806 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
15 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 34 S. Ct. 281, 58 L. Ed. 539 (1914).
16 McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 24 L. Ed. 248 (1877).
17 Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 36 S. Ct. 78, 60 L. Ed. 206 (1915); Crane v. New York,
239 US. 195, 36 S. Ct. 85, 60 L. Ed. 218 (1915).
18 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 44 S. Ct. 15, 68 L. Ed. 255 (1923).
19 People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 429 (N.Y.), afJ'd, 239 U.S. 195, 36 S. Ct. 85, 60 L. Ed.
218 (1915), citing N.Y. LAws ch. 57 § 17 (1909).
20 Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1970): "The right of a person
to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged
because of race.
21 The practice of denying to aliens, upon the basis of race, the right to become a
citizen is one peculiar to the United States. There was no such precedent in common law.
I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 0374. Yet, from their incipiency
the naturalization laws of the United States denied "white" slaves and all "non-white"
aliens the right to attain citizenship. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. Following
the passage of the fourteenth amendment, "aliens of African nativity and . . . persons
of African descent" were extended naturalization privileges, leaving only Asiatic aliens
excluded. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254. Asiatics were not excluded
expressly, but by implication, since all "non-whites" not of African descent or nativity
were excluded. During this period, race exclusion occurred on a case-by-case basis as the
following nationalities were held to come under this exclusion category: Japanese, Chinese,
Hindus, Afghans, Burmese, Hawaiians, Koreans, and Filipinos. M. KoNvrrz, THE ALIEN
AND THE AsIATIC IN AMERICAN LAw 96 (1946). The situation was such that in 1944, Earl
G. Harrison, United States Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, resigned,
stating that the only other country in the world which denied naturalization on the basis
of race was Nazi Germany. Id. at 80.
22 239 U.S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131 (1915).
23 Id. at 41, 36 S. Ct. at 10, 60 L. Ed. at 135 (1915). "The right to work for a living
in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure."
24 See Fellman, The Alien's Right to Work, 22 MINN. L. REv. 137 (1938).
26334 U.S. 410, 68 S .Ct. 1138, 92 L. Ed. 1478 (1948).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 4 [2022], No. 2, Art. 4

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:181

with citizens. The Court noted that the "power of a state to apply its
laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within
narrow limits. ' 28 The Court's later decisions "established that classifications based on alienage.., are inherently suspect and subject to close
judicial scrutiny." 27 This more recent line of authority has removed
the validity of the arguments which once denied to the alien many of
the rights of a citizen, including the right to work at a chosen occupation.
In re Day28 is regarded as the leading case in the field of bar admission standards. In Day the court stated that any classification made a
requisite for the practice of law "must have some reference to learning,
character, or ability to engage in such practice." 29 The Supreme Court
stated the applicable test in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners.
A State can require high standards of qualification such as good
moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualifications must have a rational con80
nection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.
The Court has also stated that an entire class, such as Negroes, can
obviously not be excluded, 8' even though statistics might show that the
excluded class has a higher crime rate,82 that applicants cannot be
excluded for lack of character or loyalty to the United States government without substantive proof of bad character or disloyalty, 8 and
that the State may not wholly exclude from admission8 4 to the bar
members of any organization, even the Communist party.
Recently a new development has occurred which should encourage
the states to review their alien exclusion laws without awaiting test
cases. For some time state courts have asserted the view that because
admission to a state bar is particularly within the realm of state regulation, the lower federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction,
or will abstain in suits challenging their validity.8 5 This view was dissipated, however, when four federal district courts within twelve months
heard suits challenging state bar admission residency requirements,
26 Id. at 420,
27 Graham v.

68 S. Ct. at 1143, 92 L. Ed. at 1488 (1948).
Richardson, 403, US. 365, 372, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L. Ed.2d 534, 541

(1971).

28 54
29 Id.

N.E. 646 (Ill. 1899).
at 647.
80 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77 S. Ct. 752, 756, 1 L. Ed.2d 796, 801 (1957).
81 Id. at 239, 77 S. Ct. at 756, 1 L. Ed.2d at 802 (1957).

82 See, e.g., Legislation, Constitutionality of Legislation Discriminating Against the Alien
in His Right to Work, 83 PA. L. REv. 74, 88 n.28 (1934).
8 Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 702, 27 L. Ed.2d 639 (1971); Application of

Stolar, 401 US. 23, 91 S.Ct. 713, 27 L. Ed.2d 657 (1971).
84 Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6, 91 S.Ct. 702, 706, 27 L. Ed.2d 639, 646 (1971).
85 See, e.g., Starr v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 159 F.2d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 1947); In re
Russell, 236 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla. 1970).
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rejecting the states' pleas for abstention.3 6 Each of the courts held the
residency requirements, which theretofore had been labelled as "universally accepted" as alien exclusion, 87 violated the equal protection
38
clause.
It should be noted that in spite of language by some courts to the
contrary, alien exclusion from the bar was not unanimously accepted
in the United States until recently.89 In 1873 the Supreme Court noted
that "many prominent and distinguished lawyers have been admitted
to practice, both in the State and Federal Courts, who were not citizens
of the United States .... 1 -40 By 1971, however, forty-six states had
4
citizenship requirements.
Of the many cases denying aliens admission to the bar, Ex parte
Thompson 42 and Agg Large v. State Bar4 3 stand out as by far the most
important. Thompson was decided in 1824, 44 years before the fourteenth amendment became effective. The court quite correctly stated
that the bar applicant had "no right to the law or privileges of any
particular place." 4 By so finding the court could have easily dismissed
the alien applicant without further discussion, but it proceeded to give
two reasons for excluding aliens from the bar. The court stated that the
alien might be seized in time of war to the detriment of his clients and
that the alien lacks an appreciation for American institutions which is
vital to an attorney.45 The final argument for exclusion appears to
render moot any of these other reasons, for the court stated that the
admission of aliens to the bar would debase the practice of lawl
36 Potts v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971);
Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Webster v. Wofford, 321 F.
Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350
(E.D.N.C. 1970).
37 Note, Residence Requirements for Initial Admission to the Bar; A Compromise Proposal For Change, 56 CORNEr.LL L. REv. 831 (1971). All states but Florida, Illinois, Louisiana,
and Ohio have them, though some have now been held unconstitutional.
38 Potts v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971);
Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp.
1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Keenan v. Board of Bar Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C.
1970). But see Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972).
39 See, e.g., Howden v. State Bar, 283 P. 820 (Cal. 1929); In re Emmett, 2 Cal. R. 386
(N.Y. 1805). See also In re O'Sullivan, 267 F. 230 (D. Mont. 1920).
40 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139, 21 L. Ed. 442, 455 (1873).
41 V-1971 MATINDAM-HUBBELL LAw DICT. passim (104 ed. 1971). Some of the states
require citizenship indirectly by requiring that bar applicants be eligible voters. E.g.,
IND. Sup. Cr. R. 3-2 (1967) and IND. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
Only three states affirmatively allowed aliens to be admitted: Georgia, Oregon and
Tennessee. GA. CoDE ANN. § 9-104 (1936; ORE. R v. STAT. § 9.230 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-104 (Supp. 1971). The Oregon rule permits admission of an alien declarant conditional upon his becoming a citizen within six months after he is eligible. North Dakota
had no requirement of citizenship, N.D. STAT. ANN. § 27-11-03 (Supp. 1971), but this
cannot necessarily be interpreted as an acquiesence to admission of aliens.
42 10 N.C. 355 (1824).
48 23 P.2d 288 (Cal. 1933).
44 Ex parte Thompson, 10 N.C. 355, 362 (1824).
.45 Id. at 362, 363.
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Thompson must be regarded with interest, but because it preceded
the equal protection clause, it is only of historical significance. Agg
Large v. State Bar, however, was decided in 1933 and was the only
instance before 1972 where alien exclusion from the bar was challenged
as a violation of the equal protection clause. Without noting that
Thompson preceded the fourteenth amendment, the court in Agg Large
held the exclusion of aliens from the bar does not violate the equal
protection clause of the federal Constitution and cited Thompson with
approval. Besides Thompson, the Agg Large court summarized cases
from other jurisdictions to add that the practice of law is a privilege
and not a right and that because an attorney is an officer of the court, he
46
should be a citizen.
To the reasons for exclusion mentioned in Thompson and Agg
Large, other courts have added the argument that an alien cannot take
the necessary oath of allegiance required of an attorney while he
remains the citizen of a foreign state.47 There are, then, five basic arguments purporting to provide the reasonable grounds for alien exclusion
from the bar. Although these were effectively rejected by one author
as early as 1946,48 the courts have failed to re-evaluate their stand in
light of developing case law. An analysis of the reasons for exclusion
will reveal the need to abrogate the rule barring aliens from becoming
attorneys.
AN ALIEN CANNOT HAVE THE DESIRED APPRECIATION FOR
AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OR LOCAL LEGAL CUSTOMS

Whether this is a valid requirement is subject to much doubt. The
federal district courts have approached unanimity in finding that there
is "no rational relationship between 'fitness or capacity to practice law'
and the knowledge of 'local custom.' ,49 The United States Supreme

Court has stated that a state is prohibited "from excluding a person
from a profession . . . solely because he is a member of a particular

political organization or because he holds certain beliefs." 50 Thus the
bar examiners could not exclude one who has knowledge of American
political institutions but opposes them.
Even were this held a valid prerequisite for bar membership,, an
overly inclusive classification results from presuming an alien incapable
of meeting the test. The Canadian or British national certainly has
4623 P.2d 288, 289 (Cal. 1933).
47 E.g., In re Admission to the Bar, 84 N.W. 611, 612 (Neb. 1900).
48 M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 188 (1946). See also Note,
Refugees and the Professions,53 HARv. L. REv. 112, 115 (1939).
49 Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
50Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6, 91 S. Ct. 702, 706, 27 L. Ed.2d 639, 646 (1971);
Application of Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 28, 91 S. Ct. 713, 716, 27 L. Ed.2d 657, 663 (1971).
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some idea of how a common law jury system works, 51 as does the alien
licensed to practice in one state who migrates to another. 52 Often the
alien will be one who has spent the majority of his years growing up
and being educated in the United States. 53 In such instances, he will not
be the uneducated foreigner "cherishing alien prejudices" envisioned
in Thompson.54 de Tocqueville was an alien, yet was his knowledge of
American political institutions any the worse?
IN TIME OF WAR THE ALIEN'S POSSIBLE INTERNMENT
WOULD JEOPARDIZE His CLIENT'S INTERESTS

This argument only slightly merits refutation. A repetition of the
World War II wholesale seizure of an alien nationality is highly unlikely. Even then, however, Italian and German nationals were not
interned. Because of the total unlikelihood of interning British,
Canadian or Mexican nationals, exclusion on this ground also suffers
from being overly inclusive.
Speculation on the likelihood of war with whatever country or internment of whatever nationality is unnecessary. One author has logically pointed out that the contingency of war and internment is less
catastrophic to a client and far less likely than the death or severe
sickness of his attorney. 55 In either case, he loses his legal representative, but at least with internment the attorney may have enough notice

to settle his pending legal problems in an orderly manner.
PRACTICE OF LAW Is A PRIVILEGE AND NOT A RIGHT
AND MAY THEREFORE BE BURDENED UNCONDITIONALLY

THE

In several early cases, courts held that there is no Constitutional
right to practice law. 56 This was the primary reason espoused for denying admission to otherwise qualified Negroes 57 and women. 58 The
success of the state courts in denying these classes admission and deny51 See generally In re Ashford, 4 Hawaii 614 (1883) and In re O'Neill, 90 N.Y. 584 (1882)
for examples of exclusions of British and Canadian citizens.
52 See, In re Ashford, 4 Hawaii 614 (1883). Petitioner was a graduate of an American
law school and licensed to practice in two states, yet was denied admission to the Hawaiian
bar because he was not a citizen. Accord, In re Hong Yen Chang, 24 P. 156 (Cal. 1890).
53 See, e.g., Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690 (Alas. 1971); In re Chi-Dooh Li, 488 P.2d
259 (Wash. 1971).
54 10 N.C. 355, 363 (1824).
55 M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE AsIATIc IN AMERICAN LAW 188 (1946), cited with
approval in Application of Park, 484 P.2d 691, 694 (Alas. 1971).
56 E.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139, 21 L. Ed. 442, 446 (1873) and
In re Taylor, 48 Md. 28 (1877); accord, In re Russell, 236 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla. 1970);
Application of Avery, 352 P.2d 607, 609 (Hawaii 1959); Baker v. Varser, 82 S.E.2d 90, 95
(N.C. 1954).
57 In re Taylor, 48 Md. 28 (1877).
58 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 21 L. Ed. 442 (1873); In re Maddox, 50
A. 487 (Md. Ct. App. 1901).
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ing to aliens various rights in which the state had some special interest
led to the formulation of the special public interest doctrine. In Crane
v. New York5 9 the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Justice
Cardozo which upheld a New York statute excluding aliens from public
works on the basis that:
[1] Whatever is a privilege rather than a right may be made
dependent upon citizenship....
[2] In its war against poverty, the state is not required to dedicate its own resources to citizens and aliens alike....
[3] As it may discriminate between citizens and aliens in [welfare] relief, so may it discriminate in employment ....0
Later Cardozo was to describe the practice of law as "a privilege burdened with conditions."6 1
No reason for excluding aliens is more solidly refuted than this. As
early as 1867 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that as a privilege the right to practice law could be burdened with arbitrary restrictions.6 2 In Schware the Court stated that it does not matter whether the
right or privilege label is used, "the practice of law is not a matter of
State's grace."8 3 Further, in Cohen v. Hurley" the Court added that a
"State may not arbitrarily refuse a person permission to practice
law...."
The demise of the right-privilege dichotomy has been gradual but it
now appears complete.6 5 In Graham v. Richardson66 the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute denying welfare benefits
to non-citizens and cited the Crane case as the primary example of the
special public interest doctrine. It then stated that "Takahashi ...cast
doubt on the continuing validity of the special interest doctrine in all
contexts. ' 67 Noting Justice Cardozo's language in Crane, the Court
continued:
[T]he special public interest doctrine was heavily grounded on the
notion that "[w]hatever is a privilege rather than a right may be
made dependent upon citizenship." But this Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a
59 239 U.S. 195, 36 S. Ct. 85, 60 L. Ed. 218 (1915).
60 People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 430 (1915), aff'd, 239 U.S. 195, 36 S. Ct. 85, 60 L. Ed.
218 (1915).
61 In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917).
62 Ex parte Garland, 71 US. (4 Wall.) 333, 378, 18 L. Ed. 366, 370 (1867).
68 353 U.S. 232, 238 n.5, 77 S. Ct. 752, 756 n.5, I L. Ed.2d 796, 801 n.5 (1957).
64 366 U.S. 117, 122, 81 S.Ct. 954, 958, 6 L. Ed.2d 156, 162 (1961).
65 See Van Alstyne, THE DEMISE OF THE RIGHT-PRvILEcE DISTINCTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
66403 U.S. 365, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 29 L. Ed.2d 534 (1971).
67 Id. at 374, 91 S. Ct. at 1853, 29 L. Ed.2d at 543 (1971) (emphasis added).
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governmental benefit is characterized as a "right" or as a "privi68
lege."
The Graham decision appears to have provided the necessary springboard for a reawakening of aliens' rights. In Dougall v. Sugarman6" a
federal court in New York, birthplace of Crane, held that a subsequent
similar state employment statute violated the equal protection clause
in its exclusion of aliens.70 The court relied heavily upon Graham,
deploring the special public interest doctrine and right versus privilege
basis for discriminatory exclusions from occupations. The Dougall
court noted that "Graham did not explicitly overrule ...

controlling.7 1

Crane" but

Purdy & Fitzpatrick v.
stated that Crane is no longer
State72 was cited with approval for the view that recent developments
in the law of equal protection removed whatever validity Crane might
once have had.
As if more were required, the Supreme Court in Baird v. State held:
"The practice of law is not a matter of grace but of right for one who
is qualified by his learning and moral character."' 3
AN ALIEN CANNOT TAKE THE REQUIRED OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE UPON ADMISSION TO THE BAR

At common law the alien was disqualified from holding land and

practicing law. 74 Each of these required an oath of allegiance to the

sovereign and because the alien was the subject of another country, he
was considered disqualified by the maxim, "No man may serve two
masters." 75 An exception was made, however, for the denizen, an alien
76 Today, however,
who had signed letters patent to become a citizen.
77
aliens in England are licensed to practice law.

The standard oath administered upon admission to a state bar
merely requires the applicant to swear that,
he will support the Constitution of the United States and of

...

this State; that he will honestly demean himself in the practice of
law, and will discharge his duty to his client to the best of his
ability .... 78
681d. at 374, 91 S. Ct. at 1853, 29 L. Ed.2d at 594 (1971) (citations omitted).
69 339 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), prob. jurisnoted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. March 24,
1972) (No. 71-1222).
70 Accord, Hsieh v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 488 P.2d 515, 519 (Wash. 1971).
71 Dougall v. Sugarman, 339 F. Supp. 906, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 40
U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. March 24, 1972) (No. 71-1222).
72 456 P.2d 645 (Cal. 1969).
73401 U.S. 1, 8, 91 S. Ct. 702, 707, 27 L. Ed.2d 639, 648 (1971).
74 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *373, 374.
75 Id.

76

at *367.
Id. at *375.

77 W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINT 126
78 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 309 (1959). See AM. JuR. 2d DESK BOOK,
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There is nothing to disqualify an alien, even one with no desire to
become a citizen, from taking such an oath.
The very basis for extending the equal protection of the laws to
aliens is that they have equal obligations with citizens under the law.
An alien owes allegiance to the country in which he is domiciled and
obedience to its laws.79 The alien in the United States must pay taxes, 0
is subject to the military draft, 81 and may even serve as an officer in the
military.8 2 Whether he enlists or is drafted, the alien must take an oath
of allegiance.8 3

It is obvious that an alien can in fact take an oath of allegiance, but
this argument for exclusion assumes that he cannot do so in good faith.
The oath requirement itself has been upheld, 4 but the Supreme Court
cases severely limit bar examiners' inquiries into the loyalty of bar
applicants.8 5 The argument presumes the inability of an alien to take
an oath while another nation has first call on his loyalties in the event
of war. Yet one who professes that he can in clear conscience take an
oath should be allowed to do so, even though there exists some conceivable, but improbable, set of circumstances which would cause him
to renege on his oath. 0 This view is supported by Justice Marshall's
characterization of the oath as "promissory and forward looking in
87
nature."
The states which exclude aliens from bar admissions do not recognize
the common law distinction between an alien and a denizen or
declarant. Several courts have now recognized that the declarant can
with total propriety take an oath to support the constitution of the
country he has adopted, seeks to live in and has applied to for citizenship. 88 While it is this author's contention that even a non-declarant
can take any oath constitutionally permissible to require in licensing
at 234 (1962) for the American Bar Association's Recommended Oath of Admission to the
Bar.
79 Carlisle v. United

States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154, 21 L. Ed. 426, 429 (1873).

80 Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(6) (1971); 26 U.S.C. §§ 871 et seq. (1967).
8150 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 453, 454(a) (Supp. 1972), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 455(a) (1970). It should
be noted that under 8 U.S.C. § 1426(a) (1970) an alien may claim an exemption from
the draft but he is thereby made ineligible to attain citizenship. This is the only remaining
class of ineligible aliens and it is not this author's contention that statutes excluding
these aliens from bar admission are unconstitutional.
82 10 U.S.C. § 591(b)(1) (1970); 50 U.S.C. App. § 455 (1970).
88 10 U.S.C. § 502 (1970).
84 Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 91 S. Ct.
720, 27 L. Ed.2d 749 (1971).
85 Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 702, 27 L. Ed.2d. 639 (1971); Application of
Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 91 S. Ct. 713, 27 L. Ed.2d 657 (1971).
86 See In )e Ramadass, 284 A.2d 133, 137-39 (Pa. 1971).
87 Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 192, 91
S. Ct. 720, 740, 27 L. Ed.2d 749, 775 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
88 See, e.g., Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690, 694 (Alas. 1971); Raffaelli v. Committee
of Bar Examiners, 490 P.2d 1264, 1271 (Cal. 1972).
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an attorney, the general alien exclusion must fail as a denial of equal
protection, at least in so far as it includes alien declarants8 9
As AN OFFICER OF THE COURT AN
ATTORNEY SHOULD BE A CITIZEN

This is the most inscrutable of the arguments propounded. It is
nowhere explained.9 0 The attorney's role as an officer of the court must
be examined to give this argument any meaning.
In Cammer v. United States9' the Supreme Court held that an attorney is "not an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term." In
Cohen v. Hurley the Supreme Court, through Justice Harlan, characterized the practice of law in the following manner.
[L]awyers must operate in a three-fold capacity, as self-employed
businessman as it were, as trusted agents of their clients, and
as
92
assistants to the court in search of a just solution to disputes.
Thus, Justice Harlan related the term "officer of the court" to character.
In Theard v. United States"3 the Court described the attorney's role
as an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. Another
court has said that as an officer of the court, the attorney is "charged
with obedience to the laws of this state and to the laws of the United
States .... -94Again the references appear to relate to the character of
the attorney.
It has been stated that the two permissible standards in licensing
attorneys are character and fitness to practice law and the Supreme
Court has reiterated this view. 95 An officer of the court should, of
course, be a competent representative of the court, but this standard is
measureable by the bar examination and a requirement that applicants
have graduated from an accredited law school.
As to character, no longer may it be assumed that aliens as a class
lack character9" in order to exclude an "entire class rather than its
89 Denial of equal protection may frequently occur through an overly inclusive classification, one which has exceeded the numbers of those similarly situated with respect to the
legislative purpose. General alieanage restrictions are of this type-and should at best be
those who have not registered any intent to become citizens. See, Developments in the Law
-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. RaV. 1065, 1086 (1969).
90
Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690, 694 (Alas. 1971). See also In re Day, 54 N.E. 646,

650 (Ill. 1899).

91 350 US. 399, 405, 76 S. Ct. 456, 459, 100 L. Ed. 474, 478 (1956).

92 366 U.S. 117, 124, 81 S. Ct. 954, 958, 6 L. Ed.2d 156, 162 (1961).
93 354 U.S. 278, 281, 77 S. Ct. 1274, 1276, 1 L. Ed.2d 1342, 1345 (1957).
94 People v. Wilson, 490 P.2d 954, 955 (Colo. 1971).
95 Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 8, 91 S. Ct. 702, 707, 27 L. Ed.2d 639, 647 (1971);
Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159, 91
S. Ct. 720, 724, 27 L. Ed.2d 749, 756 (1971).
96 People v. Lovato, 65 Cal. Rptr. 638, 642 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968): "[A] person does not
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objectionable members selected by more empirical methods. '97 Because
"[t]he practice of law is not a matter of grace, but of right for one who
is qualified by his learning and his moral character,"9 8 the equal protection clause dictates that the alien be accorded individual analysis.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Within a one year period, four state supreme courts have reconsidered their bar admission rules excluding aliens. In Application of
Park,99 the Alaska Supreme Court analyzed the five arguments for
exclusion and rejected them all. The court recognized the interests to
be protected by licensing attorneys, but found, "None of these interests
is directly served by a requirement that attorneys be citizens of the
United States."' 100 The court, however, avoided the necessity of ruling
on the constitutionality of the citizenship requirement by merely finding it an unacceptable requirement for the reason that it "does not...
'have a rational connection with one's fitness to practice law' ....- 10

The Washington Supreme Court followed the lead set by Park. In
In re Chi-Dooh Li 102 the court amended its rule excluding aliens rather
than finding it violative of the equal protection clause. The court did
not discuss the validity of the reasons for excluding aliens, but did cite
Park for "[s]ome of the salutary reasons for this rule change."'10 3
It should be noted that in both Park and Chi-Dooh Li the courts did
not open the door for admission to all alien applicants. In each instance
the petitioner had signed a sworn declaration of intent to become a
United States citizen with the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Both courts altered their rules only to allow admission of aliens who
had manifested their intent to become citizens.
In 1972, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court was faced with
the application for admission to the bar of an alien who had no desire
to become a United States citizen. In In re Griffiths104 the Connecticut
Supreme Court became only the Second court to determine the validity
of an equal protection attack on the exclusion of aliens from the bar.
The court noted the recent cases of Graham v. Richardson and Dougall
v. Sugarman, but rejected the applicant's constitutional challenge.
demonstrate instability, nor does he show a tendency toward crime, simply because he is
not a citizen of this country."
97 Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 397, 47 S. Ct. 630, 632, 71 L. Ed.
1115, 1120 (1927).
98 Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 8, 91 S. Ct. 702, 707, 27 L. Ed.2d 639, 648 (1971).
99484 P.2d 690 (Alas. 1971).
100 Id. at 692.
101 Id. at 695.

102488 P.2d 259, 260 (Wash. 1971).
108 Id. at 260 n.1.
104-

A.2d -

(Conn. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. April 17, 1972)

(No. 71-1336).
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The Connecticut court sought to give added meaning to the term
"officer of the court" by explaining the "unique status accorded to
members of the Connecticut bar .... ,.,05 In Connecticut an attorney is
a commissioner of the superior court and in that capacity is empowered
to sign writs otherwise issuable only by a clerk or judge. This, the court
felt, provided the Connecticut attorney with such an integral role in
the judicial system as to require only citizens to participate.
The court's argument cannot support alien exclusion. Although an
attorney may be afforded an elevated status by some states, the powers
listed by the Connecticut court relate only to character, not to citizenship. In its decision the Connecticut court relied on four cases "which
have discussed the relationship between citizenship and admission to
the bar": 10 6 Ex parte Thompson, Agg Large v. State Bar, Petition of
Rocafort,10 7 and Application of Skousen.l08 None of these cases rationally support alien exclusion.
Ex parte Thompson has been noted as preceding the equal protection clause and ends with the justification that aliens would debase the
practice of law. Agg Large v. State Bar has stood for 38 years as the sole
court to rule on an equal protection challenge and uphold alien
exclusion. In turn, Agg Large had relied on Thompson elevating it to
whatever relevance it now has. But Agg Large has recently been overruled.109
The other two cases relied upon by the Connecticut court are
Skousen and Rocafort. The Skousen case is merely a one page per
curiam affirmation denying an alien entrance to the bar with no discussion on or claim made under the equal protection clause. 10 The
Rocafort case does mention the citizenship requirement but does not
discuss it. What Rocafort does say, however, is that "[a]lthough earned
by an alien, an LLB degree from a Florida law school creates a vested
interest or right therein which neither in law nor in equity can be
impaired.""' This language squares with the exclusion of aliens from
the bar?
In its summation, the Connecticut court states that it had applied the
Graham test in reaching its decision. The court's findings are condensed in the following passage.
Attorneys are the means through which the majority of the people
seek redress for the grievances, enforcement and defense of their
rights and compensation for their injuries and losses. The courts
105 Id. at -.
106 Id. at -.
107 186 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1966).
108 289 P.2d 406 (Ariz. 1955).
109 Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 496 P.2d 1264, 1273 (Cal. 1972).
110 Application of Skousen, 186 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1966).
111 Petition of Rocafort, 186 So. 2d 496, 498 (Fla. 1966).
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not only demand their loyalty, confidence and respect but also
require them to function in a manner that will foster public
confidence in the profession and, consequently, the judicial system.
In this light the requirement of citizenship is not simply reasonable but is basic to the maintenance of a viable system of dispensing justice under our form of government. 112
This passage appears to be no more than a rewording of the argument
that to the public an attorney is a representative of the judicial system,
an officer of the court, and as such should be a citizen. The premise may
be correct but "the conclusion remains a non sequitur." 118
In Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners114 the California Supreme Court reconsidered an attack on alien exclusion from the bar
for the first time since it had rendered the Agg Large decision. Citing
Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State"1 5 for appropriate language, the court
unanimously agreed that
. . . recent developments in the law of equal protection have
removed whatever vitality [the earlier cases in point] may have
possessed at the time of their rendition.... [Agg] Large no longer
reflects current constitutional reality, and it is hereby overruled. 11
The comprehensive opinion of the California court relies heavily on
the authorities already cited and adds those of Purdy & Fitzpatrick and
a recent California attorney general's opinion. 1 7 From the former the
court quotes:
[A]ny classification which treats all aliens as undeserving and all
United States citizens as deserving rests upon a very questionable
basis. 11
From the latter the court notes:
It is well established that the purpose behind occupational licensing is to protect the public from unqualified practitioners and it
seems clear that citizenship bears no relationship to one's professional or vocational competency or qualification. 119
From the facts of the case, it is obvious that Raffaelli intends to become
112 In re Griffiths, A.2d - (Conn. 1972).
118 Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 496 P.2d 1264, 1273 (Cal. 1972).

114 Id.

115456 P.2d 645 (Cal. 1969).
110 Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 496 P.2d 1264, 1273 (Cal. 1972) (court's
brackets).
117 55 OPS. CAL. ATry. GEN. 80 (1972).
118 Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 496 P.2d 1264, 1271 (Cal. 1972), citing
Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 456 P.2d 645, 656 (Cal. 1969).
119 Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 496 P.2d 1264, 1275 (Cal. 1972), citing 55
OPS. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 80, 82 (1972).
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an American citizen, yet the California court does not so state and its
decision is not based upon this fact. Rather, it finds the general exclusion of aliens to be unconstitutional. Although the court distinguishes
the Connecticut decision, it does not do so on a declarant-non-declarant
basis but upon the Connecticut court's emphasis on the unique status
of an attorney in that state.' 20 Although any distinction made between
the two cases is lamentable, it is not inexplicable.12 ' The decision in
Griffiths should not be accepted and distinguished, but rather should
be rejected. The reasonings of Griffiths cannot coexist with those of
Raffaelli and the alien exclusion remains unsupportable in light of the
authority upon which Raffaelli rests.
CONCLUSION

The exclusion of aliens from the bar is a "lingering vestige of a xenophobic attitude,"'122 an attitude which the bench and the bar cannot
afford to promote. The demise of the right versus privilege and special
public interest doctrines and the expanding applications of the equal
protection clause now place the alien in an advantageous position to
successfully challenge his exclusion from the legal profession.
If the states wish to retain control over their own bar admissions,
they should examine Raffaelli and Park and re-evaluate their rules excluding aliens. The federal district courts have demonstrated in the
residency requirement cases that they will not hesitate to use the equal
protection clause to guarantee the right to practice law to any qualified
applicant who has even temporarily been denied that right. In the
Griffiths appeal, 12 the Supreme Court will have its first opportunity to
decide whether non-declarant aliens may be excluded from the bar.
Whichever course the Court follows, 124 the state courts must now recogRaffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 496 P.2d 1264, 1274 n.10 (Cal. 1972).
The Grifflths decision was rendered in February of 1972 and was unreported when
the Raffaelli case was filed on May 24, 1972. Griffiths is referred to only in one footnote
in Raffaelli and the language quoted is only that which appears in United States Law
Week.
122 Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 496 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Cal. 1972).
123 Prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. April 17, 1972) (No. 71-1336).
124 There are three possibilities offered by a Supreme Court review of the Griffiths
decision.
(1) The Court may affirm, finding no violation of equal protection. If so, only the
question of the exclusion of non-declarant aliens would be resolved and the Raffaelli and Griffiths cases would coexist as authority for states to exclude only
non-declarant aliens.
(2) The Court may reverse, finding a violation of equal protection. This ruling would
encompass all aliens because if the states cannot exclude aliens with no intention
of becoming citizens, they certainly cannot exclude those who have manifested an
intent to become a citizen.
(3) The Court, may, however, avoid reaching the equal protection question by re120
121
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nize that citizenship bears no rational relationship to the only permissible licensing standards, character and knowledge of the law, and

should admit non-declarant aliens.
versing on one of two other grounds of appeal, see 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (1972)
(No. 71-1336), thus leaving the question of alien exclusion in its present status.
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